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Abstract
In a competitive-equilibrium analysis of giving to charity, we show that strategic
complementarity between individual giving and aggregate giving can lead to multiple
equilibria. This provides a possible explanation for observed heterogeneity in giving.
It is possible, but not necessary, that at a low equilibrium in giving (LE), an increase
in subsidy reduces giving (perverse comparative statics) while at a high equilibrium
(HE) the comparative statics are normal (subsidies promote giving). The perverse
comparative statics at LE preclude using subsidies to move the economy to HE. We
show how temporary direct government grants can engineer a permanent move from
LE to HE. Once HE is established, the optimal mix of private and public giving
is determined using a welfare analysis. We show that the Nash non-cooperative
outcome is virtually identical to the competitive-equilibrium, even for relatively small
numbers of givers. The competitive-equilibrium approach is more tractable and
plausible, and more general because it does not rely on a symmetric equilibrium. We
also show how our results are applicable to redistributive and public good contexts.
Keywords: Multiple equilibria; aggregate strategic substitutes and complements;
competitive and non-cooperative equilibria; direct grants; charitable redistribution;
voluntary contributions to public goods; optimal mix of public and private giving.
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Charitable donations is a signi￿cant economic activity. For instance, in 2003, for the USA,
89 percent of all households gave to charity with the average gift being $1620 per annum,
which gives an aggregate total of about $100 billion per annum; see, Mayr et al. (2009).
The economics of charity has elicited notable scholarship but it relies on the following two
essential assumptions. Our aim is to relax both these assumptions.
1. First, individual giving to charity is determined by a non-cooperative game, typically
focussing on a symmetric Nash equilibrium. It is not entirely convincing or plausible
that when someone decides to contribute, say £10, to the Red Cross, they are en-
gaged in a strategic game in charitable contributions with respect to all other givers.
Certainly, no evidence of this seems to have been provided. Indeed, if there is a large
number of givers, most being small and dispersed, then the notion of a competitive
equilibrium in charitable giving seems worth exploring.
2. Second, the analysis typically focusses on a unique equilibrium in giving. Multi-
ple equilibria would seem to be endemic in many important economic phenomena,
however, they are typically ruled out by assumption. In particular, in a charitable
context, it is quite conceivable that the uncoordinated giving of a large number of
dispersed small givers gives rise to multiple equilibria, depending on the beliefs held
by the givers.
Before we give an overview of our paper in section 2, below, we summarize our seven
main contributions. First, we show that aggregate strategic complementarity is a necessary
condition for multiple equilibria in a competitive equilibrium in charitable contributions.
Strategic complementarity at the individual level is su¢ cient but not necessary to en-
sure aggregate strategic complementarity. Second, we show that even for relatively small
numbers of contributors, the competitive solution is similar to the non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium. Third, multiple equilibria provide a possible explanation of heterogeneity in
charitable giving. It is possible that at a low equilibrium in individual and aggregate giving,
the comparative statics are perverse (i.e., subsidies reduce giving), while the high equilib-
rium exhibits normal comparative statics (i.e., subsidies promote giving). In our fourth
contribution, we show how, using temporary direct grants, a policy maker can engineer a
move from the low to the high equilibrium. Now consider the case where comparative sta-
tics at the low equilibrium are normal and those at the high equilibrium are perverse. In
our ￿fth contribution, we show that in this case, the government can do better than simply
encouraging subsidy-induced giving at the low equilibrium. Indeed, once the government
successfully engineers a move to the high equilibrium using temporary direct grants, the
1perverse comparative statics at the high equilibrium ensure that a reduction in subsides
will induce even greater private giving. Sixth, by carrying out a welfare analysis, we give
conditions that specify the optimal mix of public contributions and private contributions
to charity. Seventh, we show our results are applicable to redistributive and public goods
contexts.
Section 2 gives an overview of our paper. Section 3 describes the general theoretical
model. Section 4 gives two illustrative examples of voluntary private contributions to
redistribution and public good provision, respectively. Section 5 derives the equilibrium
of the model and its comparative static results. Section 6 examines multiple equilibria in
aggregate giving. Section 7 performs a welfare analysis and characterizes the normatively
optimal public policy. Section 8 provides an explicit solution and numerical analysis of
the two examples of section 4. Section 9 explores the implications of giving when givers
play a symmetric non-cooperative Nash equilibrium and illustrates the robustness of our
results. Section 10 concludes. Most proofs are collected in the appendix.
2. Overview
We ￿rst highlight some stylized facts, S1-S5, associated with philanthropic activity.1
S1 There is substantial heterogeneity in giving between countries. As a percentage of
GDP, for 1995-2000, non-religious philanthropic activity was in excess of 4% for the
Netherlands and Sweden; 3-4% for Norway and Tanzania; 2-3% for France, UK,
USA; and less than 0.5% for India, Brazil, and Poland; see Salamon et al. (2004).
S2 Individual private donors are the largest contributors. For US data, for 2002, individ-
uals accounted for 76.3 percent of the total charitable contributions. Other givers are:
foundations (11.2%), bequests (7.5%), corporations (5.1%); see Andreoni (2006).
S3 Government direct grants are signi￿cant. For non-US data, governments are typically
the single most important contributors to charities. On average, in the developed
countries, charities receive close to half their total budget directly as grants from the
government, while the average for developing countries is about 21.6 percent.2
S4 Contributions to charity are typically tax deductible. For instance, charitable deduc-
tions range from up to 50% in the US and 17-29% for Canada.
S5 Seed money, leadership contributions and direct grants are e⁄ective in stimulating
charitable giving. Evidence suggests that in addition to private giving, direct grants
1Andreoni (2006) deals with several of these facts in greater detail.
2See the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonpro￿t Sector Project (http://www.jhu.edu/~cnp/).
2in the form of seed money or leadership contributions (which precede private giving)
made by governments, foundations, the national lottery (as in the UK), or excep-
tionally rich individuals etc. are e¢ cacious.3
2.1. Setting up a bare bones model to explain the basic intuition
Suppose that n givers to a charity contribute respective amounts g1;g2;:::;gn. Let G be
the total contributions received by the charity. The utility function of the ith giver, ui, is4
u
i(ci;gi;G); i = 1;2;:::;n, (2.1)
where ci is own private consumption, and gi is own contribution to charity. Two inter-
pretations could be given to G in (2.1). G could re￿ ect pure altruism on the part of
individuals (see Example 4.1, below) or G could be the aggregate level of public goods (see
Example 4.2, below). The term gi re￿ ects warm glow or prestige from the act of giving
(also known as impure altruism). There is overwhelming experimental/￿eld evidence and
growing neuroeconomic evidence that justi￿es such a formulation.5
The budget constraint of individual giver, i, is
ci + (1 ￿ s)gi ￿ (1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i, (2.2)
where mi is individual i￿ s exogenous income, s is the per-unit subsidy to charitable giving
(fact S4), t is the income tax rate, and ￿i is individual-speci￿c receipt of money from the
charity (it is, of course, possible that some individuals only contribute, but receive nothing
from the charity).6
The government has a balanced budget such that tax revenues (
Pn
i=1 tmi), net of the
total cost of subsidies to charity (
Pn
i=1 sgi), are contributed as a direct government grant,
D, to the charity (fact S3).
Aggregate contributions to charity, the sum of public and private contributions, are,
G = D +
Xn
i=1 gi. (2.3)








3See, for instance, Karlan and List (2007), Potters et al (2007), and Rondeau and List (2008).
4Superscripts on names of functions, such as u, will range over individuals while subscripts will indicate
partial di⁄erentiation.
5For the evidence on altruism, see Andreoni (2006). For experimental evidence on warm glow prefer-
ences, see Andreoni (1993, 2006), Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) and Andreoni and Miller (2002). For the
neuroeconomic evidence see, for instance, Harbaugh et al. (2007), Moll et al. (2006), and for a survey of
the neuroeconomic evidence see Mayr et al. (2009).
6We could have also allowed for direct redistributive grants from the government to the public. These
can be easily accommodated in our model, but add nothing to the results, while complicating the exposi-
tion.
3which is followed by the public￿ s choice of ci;gi.7
We assume that ui is strictly increasing in ci, so the budget constraint (2.2) binds:
ci = (1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i ￿ (1 ￿ s)gi, i = 1;2;:::;n. (2.5)
We derive two useful representations of utility. Substituting from (2.5) into (2.1):
U
i (gi;G;s;t) = u
i((1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i ￿ (1 ￿ s)gi;gi;G), i = 1;2;:::;n. (2.6)
Let G￿i be the sum of givings by all individuals other than individual i, G￿i =
Pn
j6=i gj.
Then (2.3) can be written as G = D + gi + G￿i, and the utility function of individual i,
(2.6), can be written as
e U
i (gi;G￿i;s;t;D) = U
i (gi;D + gi + G￿i;s;t), i = 1;2;:::;n. (2.7)
In representations, (2.6) and (2.7), the main di⁄erence that we want to focus on is that, in
the former, utility depends on aggregate contributions, G, while in the latter it depends
on the contributions of all others, G￿i.
2.2. Equilibrium: Strategic or competitive?
There are at least two possible methods to determine the endogenous variables of the
model. Both use a two-stage game to model behavior. In the ￿rst stage, in both methods,
the government chooses s, t and D so as to maximize (2.4), correctly anticipating the
behavior of the givers in the second stage. The two methods di⁄er, however, in the
behavior of givers in the second stage, which we now describe.
1. Strategic behavior. In the second stage, each giver, i, chooses his/her giving, gi, so as
to maximize his/her utility, e Ui, conditional on total giving by other givers, G￿i (see
(2.7)). For tractability, existing mainstream models restrict attention to a symmet-
ric Nash equilibrium. The strategic approach is not unambiguously justi￿ed, as the
following considerations illustrate.
(a) There is a great deal of evidence that the predictions of a Nash equilibrium
are often, and systematically, violated; see, Camerer (2003).8 Several behavioral
alternatives include: quantal response equilibrium, level-k models, models of noisy
introspection etc. A discussion of these is beyond the scope of this paper.
(b) Large donors may behave in a strategic manner (say, to establish green creden-
tials) but their share in the total contributions is small (5.1% for the US).
7Hence, D has the nature of seed money or leadership contributions (fact S5).
8For a more recent list of readings, the reader may consult, for instance, Vincent Crawford￿ s website
at: http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/.
4(c) It stretches credulity to believe that individuals contributing relatively small
amounts to charities are playing a strategic non-cooperative game vis-a-vis all other
contributors. The literature does not provide any evidence for this assumption.
2. Competitive equilibrium: In this view, which we subscribe to, for reasons 1(a),1(b),1(c),
there is a very large number of contributors who are individually very small (fact
S2). In a competitive markets view, any gi is su¢ ciently small compared to G, so
that each giver i takes total giving, G, as exogenous (see (2.6)).
2.2.1. The convergence of the Nash equilibrium to the competitive equilibrium
Although we choose the competitive equilibrium view, however, to facilitate comparison
with the existing literature, we also compute the symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies.
Our calibration results suggest that even for relatively small numbers of contributors to
charity (around 500, which should be satis￿ed for many charities), the competitive and the
Nash equilibrium outcomes are very similar in terms of individual and aggregate giving.9
In this sense, the two approaches are complementary.
However, the strategic approach has the shortcoming that, for reasons of tractability,
it is typically restricted to a symmetric Nash equilibrium only. On the other hand, the
symmetric and non-symmetric competitive equilibria are equally tractable, and allow for
the exploration of much richer results.
2.3. Existence and some implications of multiple equilibria
It is entirely plausible that coordination problems among diverse and numerous small
contributors give rise to multiple equilibria. Suppose that individual private giving, gi, and
aggregate giving (or the size of the charity), G, are strategic complements.10 Thus, the
marginal utility of contributing an extra unit of gi is increasing in the level of G. Now, if
one conjectures that G will be high (low), then one is also induced to contribute a larger
(smaller) amount, gi. Hence, there could be several, self ful￿lling, rational expectations
equilibria. In some equilibria, giving is high (HE), while in other equilibria, giving is low
(LE). One could rank multiple equilibria by the amount of individual and aggregate giving
and also possibly socially rank the equilibria. There are two immediate implications.
1. Multiple equilibria potentially explain heterogeneity in giving (fact S1). Among
identical societies some can get stuck at HE, while others can be stuck at LE.
9The result is reminscent of the Cournot outcome approximating the competitive equilibrium outcome
when the number of ￿rms becomes large.
10In terms of (2.6), gi;G are strategic complements (strategic substitutes), i⁄ @
2U
i
@gi@G ￿ 0 (￿ 0).
52. At some equilibria, one might obtain perverse comparative static results (i.e., an
increase in subsidy, s, reduces contributions). At other equilibria, the comparative
static results could be normal, in the sense that contributions respond positively to
incentives. Policy makers could, understandably, be interested in engineering a move
from a low equilibrium with perverse comparative statics (LE-P) to a high equilibrium
with normal comparative statics (HE-N), if such equilibria exist.
2.4. Engineering moves between multiple equilibria
Suppose that we have two, and only two, equilibria, LE-P and HE-N, but the economy
is stuck at LE-P. Consider a policy maker who desires to engineer a move from LE-P to
HE-N. How should the policy maker proceed? Clearly incentives for charitable giving, in
the form of higher subsidies, s, will not work because of the perverse comparative static
e⁄ects at LE-P. Suppose, instead, that the government gives a temporary direct grant, D,
to the charity, ￿nanced by an income tax (levied at the rate t).11 Let D exceed the level
of aggregate contributions, G, at LE-P. This, as we shall see in greater detail below, leaves
HE-N as the only feasible equilibrium.
Once the economy arrives at the equilibrium HE-N (where the comparative statics are
normal), the government can withdraw the temporary direct grant, D, and successfully
stimulate private giving through greater subsidies. This is welfare improving, because,
unlike direct grants, increased private giving confers warm glow on the contributors. The
applicability of these ideas is illustrated by examples where voluntary giving contributes
towards public redistribution or towards public goods (see sections 4 and 8).12
2.5. A brief comparison with some other models of multiple equilibria
Our rationale for multiple equilibria in a competitive equilibrium is very di⁄erent from
Andreoni￿ s (1998) strategic-Nash framework, which requires non-convexities in production.
Unlike Andreoni (1998), we perform a welfare analysis in a general equilibrium model with
a government budget constraint where the ￿scal parameters (such as s;t;D) are optimally
determined. Like us, Andreoni (1998) shows that policy can engineer moves between the
various equilibria. However, in his model that requires the government to have the ability
11Empirical evidence shows that crowding-out of private contributions by direct government grants, if
any, is quite small. See Andreoni (2006) for a discussion of the empirical evidence. It is also likely that
some of the observed crowding-out is due to moral hazard issues on account of the fundraising activities
by the charity. These issues lie beyond the scope of our paper.
12These results also provide another explanation for why seed money or leadership donations are often
e⁄ective in improving the level of private charitable giving (fact S5). Seed money, leadership contributions
and national lottery money play a role similar to the direct grant, D, in our framework. Existing models
assume a unique equilibrium, hence, we provide an alternative explanation to this important phenomenon.
6to levy taxes based on individual characteristics. We only need the weaker assumption
that the government be able to observe the income of individuals.
The idea of engineering a move from a low equilibrium characterized by poverty traps
to an equilibrium with greater prosperity is important in development economics.13 Mur-
phy et al. (1989) focus on the mechanism of aggregate demand spillovers arising from a
coordinated increase in outputs in a range of imperfectly competitive industries. However,
our mechanism for engineering moves between equilibria is very di⁄erent.
Strategic complementarity is a necessary condition for multiple equilibria in the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium framework of Cooper and John (1988). We propose a natural
extension of this condition to competitive equilibria, aggregate strategic complementarity,
that we show to be the necessary condition for multiple equilibria in competitive contexts.
Our new proposed concept is likely to have wide applicability.
3. Formal model
There are three main types of players in the economy, (1) consumers, (2) a ￿scal authority
(which we will simply refer to as the Government), and (3) charities. There are n con-
sumers indexed by i = 1;2;:::;n. Consumer i has an exogenously ￿xed income of mi ￿ 0




Assume that M > 0, i.e., at least some consumers have positive income.
3.1. Fiscal instruments
The government exercises the following three types of ￿scal instruments. (i) An income
tax on individual income, mi, at the rate t, 0 ￿ t < 1. (ii) A subsidy to private giving to
charity at the rate, s, 0 ￿ s < 1. (iii) Direct public contribution to charity, D ￿ 0.
3.2. Consumers
The utility function of consumer i is given by
u
i (ci;gi;G). (3.2)
The consumer derives utility from private consumption expenditure, ci, from own giving
to charity (warm glow)14, gi, and from the aggregate level of giving to charity, G ￿ 0.
13The idea goes back to Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and was formalized later on by Murphy, Shleifer and
Vishny (1989).
14The introduction of a warm glow motive was suggested by Cornes and Sandler (1984) and Andreoni
(1989, 1990). The presence of a warm glow term re￿ ects the fact that individuals no longer consider their
7Consumers derive utility from G either because G ￿nances goods that are useful to the
individual (sel￿sh preferences), or because they are useful to others (altruistic preferences).
Remark 1 (Notation): Superscripts on the utility function denote the identity of individ-
ual givers (e.g., ui is the utility function of the ith giver). On the other hand, subscripts
are used to denote partial derivatives (e.g., ui
2 = @ui=@gi).
The assumptions on preferences are quite standard. gi, is bounded below by zero while
ci is bounded below by a constant, ci ￿ 0 (possibly a subsistence level). We assume that ui
is a C2 function (continuous, with continuous ￿rst and second partial derivatives) for gi > 0
and ci > ci. We also assume that ui
1 > 0, ui
11 ￿ 0 (strictly positive but non-increasing
marginal utility of consumption), ui
2 ￿ 0, ui
3 ￿ 0 (non-negative marginal utilities of own
and aggregate giving) and ui
22 ￿ 0 (concavity in own giving). In addition we make some
technical assumptions. The ￿rst of these, (3.3), guarantees concavity in own giving of a








22 < 0, (3.3)
u
i
1 " 1 as ci # ci. (3.4)
We assume that either ui is extended to the boundary, gi = 0, as a continuous function or
u
i
2 " 1 as gi # 0. (3.5)
Examples that satisfy the above assumptions include u =
p
c + g or u = ln(c ￿ 1) + lng.
The more complex examples 4.1 and 4.2 in section 4 also satisfy these assumptions.
The budget constraint of consumer i is given by
ci + (1 ￿ s)gi ￿ (1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i. (3.6)
The RHS of (3.6) is the after-tax income plus an individual-speci￿c transfer, ￿i ￿ 0,
received from the charity￿ s aggregate revenue, G.15 The LHS gives the two sources of
expenditure, private consumption and the (net of subsidy) private charitable giving. Note
that s and t are instruments of government, while ￿i is an instrument of the charity.
contributions to be perfect substitutes for the contributions of others. Hence, there is extra utility from
one￿ s own contribution, which mitigate the free rider problem arising from purely altruistic considerations,
i.e., from a utility function of the form ui (ci;G). It also obviously implies that government grants to
charities do not crowd out private donations completely because the two are imperfect substitutes from
the point of view of givers.
15This does not preclude the possibility that some individuals only contribute, but receive nothing from
the charity.
8Furthermore, we assume that each gi is a small fraction of G, so that each consumer
takes the aggregate G as given16. Similarly, and we believe quite realistically, consumer i
takes ￿i as given. Thus, in making her decision to allocate after-tax income between ci and
gi, the consumer takes as given mi, ￿i, s, t, G (as in the theory of competitive markets)
and maximizes ui given in (3.2) subject to the budget constraint (3.6).
3.3. Government
Total income tax revenues equal
Pn
i=1 tmi = t
Pn
i=1 mi = tM. The proceeds of the income
tax, tM, are used to ￿nance subsidies on donations to charity, s
Xn
i=1 gi, and on aggregate
direct grants from the government to the charities, D ￿ 0. Therefore, the (balanced)
government budget constraint is
tM = D + s
Xn
i=1 gi. (3.7)








which is strictly increasing in the individual utility functions, u1;u2;:::;un.17
3.4. Charities
In order to focus on the simultaneous determinants of private giving and the in￿ uence of
public policy, we assume that charities are passive players in the game18. They merely
collect all donations from private consumers,
Xn
i=1 gi, and from the government, D. The
production function for charities is a simple linear function that converts the sum of all
giving D +
Xn
i=1 gi to some aggregate output G ￿ 0, so
G = D +
Xn
i=1 gi. (3.9)
16At this point, the reader might wish to recall the discussion in subsection 2.2. In Section 9 below,
we show that the solutions under the two cases of strategic and competitive giving are very similar even
for small numbers of givers. Our approach can, of course, be made completely rigorous by adopting
an appropriate measure-theoretic formulation with a continuum of consumers. We have found this to
considerably complicate our paper, without adding anything to either our conclusions or the literature on
the measure-theoretic approach to economics.
17Note that the resulting social optimum is constrained by the available set of instruments fs;t;Dg.
In particular, an even better social optimum may be available if subsidies and taxes fsi;tig could be
varied across individuals. We assume that this is either not desirable or not possible (although it is
straightforward to extend our analysis to cope with the more general case).
18In actual practice, charities could be strategic players, using means such as bundling, marketing etc.
to attract additional donations. Charities might also put in less e⁄ort to raise additional contributions in
the presence of government grants. We abstract here from these issues. The interested reader can consult
Andreoni (2006) for further details and references on these issues.
9The charity can use G to ￿nance transfers to individuals,
Xn
i=1 ￿i or to provide a public
good.19 More generally, our model allows for the case in which the charity uses an ex-
ogenous fraction of it￿ s revenues to undertake individual-speci￿c redistribution,
Xn
i=1 ￿i,
while using the balance G ￿
Xn
i=1 ￿i to ￿nance provision of public goods.20
3.5. Sequence of moves
The government moves ￿rst to announce the parameters s;t;D. The charity (which is a
passive player) moves simultaneously to announce the parameters ￿1;￿2;:::;￿n. Each of
the small and dispersed individual givers to charity moves next, taking as given s;t;D;￿i
as well as the aggregate contributions, G, exactly as in the theory of competitive markets
(see the last paragraph in section 3.2).21
3.6. Some preliminary results
Since ui
1 > 0, the budget constraint (3.6) holds with equality. Hence, we can use it to
eliminate ci from (3.2). Letting Ui (gi;G;s;t) be the result, we have
U
i (gi;G;s;t) = u
i ((1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i ￿ (1 ￿ s)gi;gi;G). (3.10)
From (3.3) and (3.10) it follows that
U
i
11 < 0. (3.11)
The consumer￿ s maximization problem can be restated as
Maximizehgijs;t;Gi U
i (gi;G;s;t) subject to 0 ￿ gi ￿
1
1 ￿ s
[(1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i ￿ ci]. (3.12)
Proposition 1 : Suppose ci < (1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i.
(a) The consumer￿ s maximization problem (3.12) has a unique solution, g￿
i.
(b) 0 ￿ g￿
i < 1
1￿s [(1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i ￿ ci].
(c) If, in addition, (3.5) holds, then g￿
i > 0.
19One example of each of these cases is given in Section 4. The competitive and symmetric Nash solution
to both examples is given in section 8.
20An endogenous split into redistribution and public good provision will require specifying the charity￿ s
objective function in greater detail. Similar comments apply to an endogenous treatment of individual-
speci￿c redistribution (￿1;￿2;:::;￿n). However, these issues lie beyond the scope of the paper.
21The reader might wonder how the charity could possibly announce ￿1;￿2;:::;￿n prior to observing the
individual contributions, g1;g2;:::;gn. One could also pose the same question with respect to the direct
grants, D, made by the government. The government and the charity are assumed to be rational and
forward looking. Since there are no stochastic stocks in the model, the beliefs of each of these two players,
about g1;g2;:::;gn, are always ful￿lled in equilibrium. Technically, we have a perfect foresight rational
expectations equilibrium.
10We may use the example, u = ln(c ￿ 1) + lng, to illustrate the idea behind the proof
of Proposition 1. The problem is that the set on which u is de￿ned, f(c;g) : c > 1;g > 0g
is not closed. Hence, its intersection with the budget set (to produce the opportunity set)
is not a compact set. However, because u1 = 1
c￿1 " 1 as c # 1, and since u2 = 1
g " 1 as
g # 0, the maximum of u can be bounded away from c = 1 and g = 0. This allows us to
take the opportunity set to be compact with u continuous on the set f(c;g) : c > 1;g > 0g.
Hence, the existence of a maximum.
Since g￿
i is unique, we can write it as a function of the parameters that are exogenous
to the consumer￿ s maximizing problem (3.12). In particular, we write g￿
i (s;t;G) explicitly
as a function of the tax rate, t, the subsidy rate, s, and aggregate giving, G.22
A simple calculation shows that Proposition 1(b) implies the following:









On the left hand side of ￿<￿in (3.13) we have the total amount paid in taxes and donations
to charity (net of subsidy). On the right hand side of ￿<￿we have total after-tax income
minus total expenditure on subsistence consumption. Clearly, the former cannot exceed
the latter. However, from (3.4) it follows that optimal consumption must be strictly higher
than subsistence consumption. Hence, the strict inequality.
Proposition 2 : Suppose g￿
i > 0. Let c￿
i = (1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i ￿ (1 ￿ s)g￿











































3.7. Strategic complements and strategic substitutes
Following Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985), strategic complements and strategic
substitutes can be de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition 1 : (Strategic complements and substitutes) gi and G are strategic comple-
ments (substitutes) if, and only if, @2Ui
@gi@G > 0 (￿ 0).
Thus, gi and G are strategic complements (respectively, substitutes) if the marginal
utility to individual i of making an extra unit of contribution, gi, increases (respectively,
decreases) with an increase in aggregate contributions, G.
Lemma 1 : gi and G are strategic complements (substitutes) if, and only if,
u
i
23 ￿ (1 ￿ s)u
i
13 > 0 (￿ 0),
22We have suppressed other parameters such as ￿i and mi to improve readability.




> 0 (￿ 0):
4. Two illustrative examples
In this section we present two illustrative examples of the general theoretical model. In
Example 4.1, charitable contributions provide income to consumers who, otherwise, have
no income.23 In Example 4.2, charitable contributions ￿nance public good provision. Sec-
tion 8 provides an explicit solution and numerical analysis of these two examples. And in
section 9 we will compute explicitly the multiple symmetric Nash equilibria in giving for
these examples and contrast them with the competitive equilibria.
4.1. Example 1: Charitable contributions as public redistribution
We consider an economy where some consumers have no income. Their consumption
expenditure is ￿nanced entirely by either charitable donations, gi, made by other ￿ caring￿
consumers with positive income and/or by tax ￿nanced direct government grants, D (which
now have the interpretation of social welfare payments). This is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
The assumptions are as follows.
1. There are n consumers. Of these, p consumers, 0 < p < n, and indexed by i =
1;2;:::;p, have positive income (mi > 0). The other n ￿ p consumers, indexed by
i = p+1; p+2;:::;n, have no income (mi = 0). All incomes are publicly observable.
2. The aggregate of all donations to charity (private and public), G, is divided equally
among the consumers with no income; so each recipient receives ￿i = ￿ = G
n￿p.
23Hence, in a straightforward but more expositionally demanding exercise to our paper, private charita-
ble contributions supplement the public, redistributive, activities of the government (which are excluded
in our paper).
123. Of the p consumers with positive incomes, k, 0 < k ￿ p, care about the plight of
those with no income. Each of these caring consumers has the utility function
u
i = lnci + aigiG, ai > 0, i = 1;:::;k, (4.1)






mi, i = 1;:::;k. (4.2)
4. The other p￿k consumers have positive income but do not care about those with no
income. The utility function of the latter two groups of consumers (the non-caring
with positive income and those with no income) is given by
u
i = lnci; i = k + 1;k + 2;:::;p;p + 1;:::;n. (4.3)
From De￿nition 1, it follows that gi, G are strategic complements in (4.1).
4.2. Example 2: Voluntary contributions to a public good
Individuals often voluntarily contribute to, and directly use, several kinds of public goods
such as health services and education24. Suppose that the utility function of consumer i,
i = 1;2;:::;n is given by
u
i = u






+ ai lngi; (4.4)
where
0 < ai < 1, bi > 0,
bi
G
< (1 ￿ t)mi. (4.5)
Condition (4.5) guarantees that consumer i has enough disposable income, (1 ￿ t)mi, to
sustain a level of private consumption expenditure, ci, greater than
bi
G and also a positive
level of donation to charity, gi. It is straightforward to check that ui
1 > 0, ui
2 > 0, ui
3 > 0.
This example can be given the following interpretation. Private (voluntary) contribu-
tions to public goods,
Xn
i=1 gi, plus public contribution, D, ￿nanced from income taxation,
provide the necessary infrastructure for private consumption, ci. An increase in aggregate
expenditure on infrastructure, G = D +
Xn
i=1 gi, leads to a higher level of utility for a
given level of ci. Using De￿nition 1 and (4.4), gi, G are strategic complements.
24For the US, education, health and human services account for the greatest proportion of private giving
after religion; see Table 3 in Andreoni (2006).
135. Equilibrium giving and public policy
Let us begin with an analogy of competitive markets in an exchange economy. Suppose
there are n consumers who have vectors of initial endowments !1;!2;:::;!n. Let the price
vector be p. Denote the utility maximizing demand vector of the ith consumer by xi (p;!i).
The aggregate demand vector is then
Pn
i=1 xi (p;!i). The aggregate supply is, of course,
Pn
i=1 !i. There is no guarantee that at an arbitrary price vector, p, aggregate desire
to consume,
Pn
i=1 xi (p;!i), will be equal to aggregate supply,
Pn
i=1 !i. A competitive






The competitive equilibrium in charitable donations is determined in an analogous manner,
which we turn to, below.
5.1. The aggregate desire to give to charity
When making their charity decision, consumers take as given aggregate donations to char-
ity, G, and determine their optimal charitable contributions, g￿
i (s;t;G). Just as the aggre-
gate demand in competitive markets need not equal actual aggregate supply for all price
vectors, the aggregate of all desired donations, D+
Xn
i=1 g￿
i (s;t;G), need not equal actual
aggregate contributions, G. Therefore, we introduce a new function, F, which represents
the aggregate of all desires (public and private) to give to charity:





We substitute D = tM ￿ s
Xn
i=1 g￿
i (s;t;G) from (3.7) into (5.1) to get





From (3.13), (5.2) it follows that





To reduce the length of formulae, let






0 ￿ F (s;t;G) < Fmax. (5.5)
Recalling that individuals take s;t as given as this stage, hence, without loss of generality,
we may view F (s;t;G) as a mapping from [0;Fmax] to [0;Fmax].
The above discussion suggests the following de￿nition.
14De￿nition 2 : By the aggregate desire to give we mean the mapping, F (s;t;G) : [0;Fmax] !
[0;Fmax], de￿ned by
















In general, gi and G could be strategic complements for consumer i but strategic substitutes
for consumer j, j 6= i. So, we might wish to ask if in some aggregate sense, g and G are
strategic complements or substitutes. Lemma 2 and (5.6) suggest the following de￿nition.






> 0 (￿ 0).
From de￿nition 3, strategic complementarity (or substitutability) for all individuals is
su¢ cient but not necessary for aggregate strategic complementarity (or substitutability).
Lemma 3 : g and G are aggregate strategic complements (substitutes) if, and only if,
FG > 0 (￿ 0).
5.2. Competitive Equilibria
De￿nition 4 (Competitive equilibrium in giving): The economy is in a competitive equi-
librium if, and only if, the aggregate of all desires to donate to charity, F, equals the
aggregate of all donations, G, i.e., G￿ 2 [0;Fmax] is an equilibrium if, and only if,
G
￿ = F (s;t;G
￿).
Because we are interested in multiple equilibria, we need the following de￿nition.
De￿nition 5 (Isolated equilibrium): An equilibrium, G￿, is isolated if there is a neigh-
borhood of G￿ in which it is the only equilibrium.
Proposition 3 : (a) An equilibrium, G￿ 2 [0;Fmax], exists and satis￿es 0 ￿ G￿ < Fmax.
(b) If FG < 1 (and, in particular, if g and G are aggregate strategic substitutes, i.e.,
FG ￿ 0), then an equilibrium, G￿, is unique.
(c) If [FG]G￿ 6= 1, then G￿ is an isolated equilibrium.
15Proof of Proposition 3: (a) Recall that in a competitive equilibrium, G￿ = F (s;t;G￿).
Let
H (s;t;G) = G ￿ F (s;t;G):
If F (s;t;0) = 0 then, clearly, 0 is an equilibrium. Suppose F (s;t;0) > 0, then
H (s;t;0) = ￿F (s;t;0) < 0.
From (5.5), F (s;t;G) < Fmax, hence,
H (s;t;Fmax) = Fmax ￿ F (s;t;Fmax) > 0.
Since H (s;t;G) is continuous, it follows that H (s;t;G￿) = 0 for some G￿ 2 [0;Fmax), i.e.,
G
￿ = F (s;t;G
￿) and 0 ￿ G
￿ < Fmax.








@G < 1, then @H
@G > 0 for all possible values of G. Thus, in this case, the equilibrium is
unique. In particular, if g and G are aggregate strategic substitutes then, by Lemma 3,
@F
@G ￿ 0 and, hence, the equilibrium is unique.
(c) If [FG]G￿ 6= 1 then [HG]G￿ 6= 0 and, hence, G￿ is an isolated solution of H (s;t;G) =
0.￿
Figure 5.1 illustrates the results in Proposition 3. Three possible shapes of the function
H(s;t;G) are shown. Along the curve AED, the condition for uniqueness, FG < 1, holds,
and we have a unique equilibrium at E. Along the two paths, ABCD and AHD, FG > 1.
In this case, we could have a unique equilibrium (as in the case of curve AHD) or multiple
equilibria (as in the case of curve ABCD); see also our examples 4.1 and 4.2.25
5.3. Equilibrium analysis
We now investigate how aggregate equilibrium giving to charity, G, responds to the policy
instruments, s;t. We therefore consider an equilibrium, G￿, at which FG 6= 1. By Proposi-
tion 3c, such an equilibrium is isolated. We can then regard G￿ as a C1 function, G￿ (s;t),
of s and t in that neighborhood (this is a special case of the implicit function theorem).
Proposition 4 gives some comparative static results for an isolated equilibrium.
25In Cooper and John (1998), individual team members choose their e⁄ort levels, in a non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium, given the e⁄ort levels of other team members. As in Proposition 3 the strategic com-
plements turns out to be a necessary condition for multiple equilibria. It is interesting that the same
condition is crucial in the strategic and the non-strategic settings.
16Figure 5.1: Unique and multiple equilibria.
Proposition 4 : Let G￿ be an equilibrium at which FG 6= 1. Then G￿ is isolated and
(a) G￿
s (s;t) = Fs
1￿FG, (b) G￿





We now formally de￿ne the critical concepts of normal and perverse comparative sta-
tics.
De￿nition 6 (Normal and perverse incentives): Comparative statics are normal if an
increase in subsidy to private charitable giving increases aggregate contributions, i.e., G￿
s >
0. Comparative statics are perverse if an increase in subsidy to private charitable giving
reduces aggregate contributions, i.e., G￿
s < 0.
Proposition 5 : Let G￿ be an equilibrium at which FG 6= 1. Then
(a) Let Fs > 0.
(i) If FG < 1, then G￿
s (s;t) > 0. (ii) In particular, if g, G are aggregate strategic substi-
tutes, then G￿
s (s;t) > 0. (iii) If FG > 1, then G￿
s (s;t) < 0.
(b) Let Ft > 0.
(i) If FG < 1, then G￿
t (s;t) > 0. (ii) In particular, if g, G are aggregate strategic substi-
tutes, then G￿
t (s;t) > 0. (iii) If FG > 1, then G￿
t (s;t) < 0.
Proposition 6 : Let G￿ be an equilibrium at which FG 6= 1. Then
(a) Let Fs < 0.
(i) If FG < 1, then G￿
s (s;t) < 0. (ii) In particular, if gi, G are aggregate strategic
substitutes, then G￿
s (s;t) < 0. (iii) If FG > 1, then G￿
s (s;t) > 0.
17Figure 5.2: Fs > 0; s1 < s2. 0 < FG < 1 (continuous, light lines). FG > 1 (dashed lines)
(b) Let Ft < 0.
(i) If FG < 1, then G￿
t (s;t) < 0. (ii) In particular, if gi, G are aggregate strategic
substitutes, then G￿
t (s;t) < 0. (iii) If FG > 1, then G￿
t (s;t) > 0.
5.4. Normal and perverse comparative statics
Figure 5.2 illustrates the two cases of normal and perverse comparative statics in Propo-
sition 5(a). In Figure 5.2, Fs > 0 and s1 < s2. The 45o line, F = G, is shown as the dark
line. The case 0 < FG < 1 is illustrated by the two, thin, continuous straight lines, while
the other case, FG > 1 is shown by the two dashed lines. Thus, in each case, from Lemma
3, g and G are aggregate strategic complements. Figure 5.2 shows the outcome arising from
an increase in subsidy from s1 to s2, ￿nanced by an increased in taxes from t1 to t2.
A. Normal comparative statics (G￿
s > 0): Figure 5.2 illustrates Proposition 5(ai) for the
case Fs > 0, 0 < FG < 1 (although only FG < 1 is required) by an upward shift of
the continuous, light, curve F (s1;t1;G) to F (s2;t2;G). The equilibrium moves from
A to B. Hence, the optimal level of aggregate giving, G, is increasing in the subsidy
to individual giving, i.e., G￿
s > 0.
B. Perverse comparative statics (G￿
s < 0). This case is shown in Figure 5.2, by an
upward shift of the dashed curve F (s1;t1;G) to F (s2;t2;G), which assumes Fs >
0;FG > 1; as required in Proposition 5(aiii). The equilibrium moves from B to A.
Equilibrium aggregate contributions, G, decrease as the price of giving reduces (larger
s). Because FG > 1, consumers over-react to an increase in G. Thus, paradoxically,
G needs to fall in order to ensure equilibrium in the market for charity.26 The
26To aid intuition, imagine an upward sloping demand curve that cuts the supply curve from below.
18surprising e⁄ects of the tax reforms of the 1980￿ s on charitable giving in the US is
a potential example of perverse comparative statics; see, Clotfelter (1990). The tax
reforms increased the price of giving by reducing the tax preference for charitable
donations. Contrary to the predictions, charitable contributions continued to rise in
the following years.
6. Equilibrium analysis with multiple equilibria
We now turn our attention to multiple equilibria. Recall, from Proposition 3(b), that if
g;G are aggregate strategic substitutes (De￿nition 3), then the competitive equilibrium is
unique. Therefore, we assume here that g;G are aggregate strategic complements. Hence,
from Lemma 3, FG > 0. We assume that Fs > 0, s1 < s2. We distinguish between two
main cases here, FGG < 0 and FGG > 0:
6.1. Engineering moves between equilibria (Fs > 0;Ft > 0; FG > 0;FGG < 0): A
heuristic discussion
Suppose that the government￿ s objective is to move the economy from a low equilibrium
with perverse comparative statics to a high equilibrium with normal comparative statics.27
We now discuss this critical question that is central to our paper.
Suppose that the situation is as depicted in Figure 6.1. We begin with the policy
parameters of the government, s;t1;D1. The government levies income tax at the rate t1
in order to (i) grant a per unit subsidy, s, to private giving, and (ii) ￿nance a direct grant,
D1, to the charity. Using (5.1), the aggregate desire to give to the charity is





Figure 6.1 plots the locus F(s;t1;G); given the assumptions, it is increasing and concave.
There are two equilibria, a low equilibrium, G￿(s;t1), and a high equilibrium, G+(s;t1)
shown respectively as the points ￿ a￿and ￿ d￿ . Using, De￿nition 4, at G￿(s;t1);
G








An analogous equation holds for G+(s;t1). Since FG > 1 at G￿(s;t1), by Proposition
5(aiii), G￿
s < 0 (perverse comparative statics). The economy can get stuck at G￿(s;t1).
Following an increase in income, we get the perverse result that price (and quantity) will fall. In demand
theory this case requires atypical assumptions such as gi⁄en goods. By contrast, in the charity context
such cases arise naturally; aggregate strategic complementarity being a necessary condition. Recall that
G￿ = F (s;t;G￿) is the condition for a competitive equilibrium. It can be checked that when Fs > 0;
FG > 1 an increase in s and a fall in G moves in the direction of restoring equilibrium.
27We consider these issues more formally in the context of Examples 4.1 and 4.2 in Section 8, below.
19Figure 6.1: Multiple equilibria when Ft > 0; FG > 0;FGG < 0; t1 < t2:
Subsidies to private giving are ine⁄ective in moving the economy to the high equilibrium,
G+(s;t1), because G￿
s < 0.28 However, because FG < 1 at the high equilibrium, by
Proposition 5(ai), G+
s > 0 (normal comparative statics). With the aim of moving the
economy from the low equilibrium with perverse comparative statics, ￿ a￿ , to the high
equilibrium with normal comparative statics, ￿ c￿ , consider an alternative policy.
6.1.1. Moving the economy from ￿ a￿to ￿ c￿ .
Suppose that the Government makes a direct grant to the charity, D2 > D1 ￿nanced by
an income tax levied at the rate t2 > t1 such that D2 > G￿(s;t1). The policy parameters
of the government now are s;t2;D2. From (5.1), the aggregate desire to give to the charity
is




i (s;t2;G) > G
￿(s;t1) (6.1)
In terms of Figure 6.1, the economy is now on the F(s;t2;G) locus. Since it is assumed in
this section that Ft > 0, it follows that the F(:) locus has shifts upwards. The inequality
in (6.1) follows from the fact that D2 > G￿(s;t1) and our assumption that gi ￿ 0 for all i.
Since the economy is now on the F(s;t2;G) locus and G ￿ G￿(s;t1) > G￿(s;t2) the sole
candidate for equilibrium is the high equilibrium, G+(s;t2) > G+(s;t1).29
28An increase in subsidies will, therefore, simply lower G￿(s;t1) further (see the dashed lines in Figure
5.2).
29Our analysis is an equilibrium analysis without any structural dynamics, hence, it is not suitable to
answer questions about the transition dynamics between di⁄erent equilibria. Rather, as in the literature,
we have a perfect foresight rational expectations model in which the economy jumps from equilibrium
20Once G+(s;t2) is established, each individual will make her private giving decision con-
ditional on G+(s;t2), thereby, raising her own giving to a higher level such that equilibrium
beliefs about G+(t2) become self-ful￿lling. At this equilibrium,
G




6.1.2. Optimal public policy at the new equilibrium
So what should optimal public policy look like when the high equilibrium, G+(s;t2), is
established?30 From a welfare point of view, the two sources of receipts for the charity,
direct government grants, D, and individual contributions to charity, gi, are not identical.
The reason is that substantial ￿eld, experimental and neuroeconomic evidence supports
the assertion that private charitable giving is a source of warm glow, but direct government
grants are not. Hence, it would be welfare improving to replace government grants by an
equivalent amount of private giving, if possible.
Towards this end, stimulating private giving at the low equilibrium (at ￿ a￿ ) was not
possible because of perverse comparative statics (G￿
s < 0). However, at the high equilib-
rium, ￿ c￿ , the comparative statics are normal (G+
s > 0). For this reason, the incremental
direct public grant, D2 ￿ D1, could be withdrawn and replaced by an equivalent ￿ warm
glow backed￿contribution by the private sector. This, as we shall see below in Section 8,
is the case for Example 1 of Section 4.
Optimal policy, therefore, uses both ￿scal instruments, s;t, simultaneously, as follows.
The income tax rate is lowered from t2 to t1 because the additional taxes are no longer
needed to ￿nance the increased direct government grant, D2￿D1. Subsidies are e¢ cacious
at the high equilibrium (because G+
s > 0). Hence, subsidies are simultaneously increased
from s to s0, where s0 is chosen such that it induces an additional amount of private giving










Hence, an economy stuck at a low equilibrium at G￿(s;t1) is moved to a high equilibrium
G+(s;t2) ￿ G+(s0;t1). Furthermore, temporary direct government grants can be welfare
improving31.
a to c. One could use some adjustment process to study transition dynamics, e.g., the economy could
jump from point a to b when direct government grants increase from D1 to D2 and then follow the path
along the locus F(s;t2;G) to the equilibrium point, c. However, these adjustment processes are typically
ad-hoc, and, so, we do not use them.
30The discussion here is heuristic, however, these issues are formally discussed in section 7, below.
31We do not consider direct grants by non-governmental institutions, such as the national lottery in
the UK or private charitable trusts and organizations. However, such grants can be accomodated in our
framework. These will, in principle, perform a role that is similar to direct government grants except that
non-governmental organisations cannot levy taxes.
21Garrett and Rhine (2007) report that in the US, the growth in private charitable
giving over time has been paralleled by similar growth in expenditure by various levels
of government. In particular, between 1965 and 2005, the most rapid growth in private
giving (gi in our set up) has been in charities associated with health, education and social
services. These are precisely the areas in which there has been large increases in direct
government expenditure (D in our set up). The fact that the Government has responded
to an increased demand for these services by increasing the direct grant, rather than by
increasing the subsidy to private giving, is consistent with our explanation.
6.2. Increasing and convex desire to contribute (Fs > 0;Ft > 0; FG > 0;FGG > 0)
Figure 6.2: The Case Fs > 0; FG > 0;FGG > 0, s1 < s2:
Figure 6.2 shows the case of increasing and convex desire to contribute. Suppose that
the original government policy parameters are s1;t1 and the economy is on the F (s1;t1;G)
locus. Furthermore, suppose that the economy is stuck at the low equilibrium, G￿ (s1;t1).
Notice that at the low equilibrium, FG < 1, hence, using Proposition 5(ai), G￿
s > 0. In
other words, and unlike the situation in section 6.1, the comparative statics at the low
equilibrium are normal. Hence, an increase in tax exemptions, from s1 to s2; ￿nanced by
an increase in taxes from t1 to t2 would move the economy to the next, higher, equilibrium,
G￿(s2;t2) on the F (s2;t2;G) locus.
However, for whatever reasons, the government might wish to do even better, i.e., move
the economy to a high equilibrium, G+. We consider, next, this possibility in Figure 6.3.
The analysis is similar to that in section 6.1, so we will be very brief. In Figure 6.3,
suppose that the initial government policy parameters are s;t1;D1. The economy is on
22Figure 6.3: Multiple equilibria when Ft > 0; FG > 0;FGG > 0; t1 < t2:
the F (s;t1;G) locus. Suppose that it is stuck at the low equilibrium, G￿(s;t1), at point
￿ a￿ , and the policymakers wish to move to a high equilibrium, point ￿ d￿ .
Consider a temporary increase in the direct government grant to charity from D1 to
D2, ￿nanced by raising taxes at the rate t2 > t1 ￿ 0 and D2 > G￿(s;t2). The economy
is now on the F (s;t2;G) locus which is higher because Ft > 0. Therefore, the aggregate
desire to give to charity is D2 +
Xn
i=1 gi (s;t2;G) > G￿(s;t2). Hence, the only possible
candidate for equilibrium on the F (s;t2;G) locus is the high equilibrium, G+(s;t2), point
￿ c￿ , where the comparative statics are perverse (because FG > 1).32
Once the high equilibrium, G+(s;t2), is established then the government can withdraw
its additional direct grant, D2 ￿ D1 and eliminate the additional tax that was needed to
￿nance it, hence, the tax rate reduces from t2 to it￿ s original level t1. Since the comparative
statics at the equilibrium G+(s;t2) are perverse i.e., G+
s (s;t2) < 0, the subsidy is reduced











Substituting gi (s;t;G￿ (s;t)) and G￿ (s;t) in the individual utility function (3.10) gives
the consumer￿ s indirect utility function
v
i (s;t) = u




32Our earlier comments on transition dynamics apply here as well. It is in the light of those comments
that point b in Figure 6.3 could be interpreted.




















where, the partial derivatives Gs; Gt are given by Proposition 4(a),(b), respectively.
Substituting the indirect utility function from (7.1) into (3.8) we get the government￿ s
indirect (social) utility function































where subscripts on the utility functions, U, u denote appropriate partial derivatives.
Propositions 7, 8 and 9, below, derive the optimal mix between private and public
giving to charity in di⁄erent cases. These propositions are used extensively in Section 8
and are crucial in determining the optimal public policy at di⁄erent equilibria.
Proposition 7, below, implies that in an optimum where G￿
t ￿ 0, no government inter-
vention is needed, warm glow and/or altruism su¢ ce to maximize social welfare.
Proposition 7 : If G￿
t ￿ 0 then s = t = 0: Since t = 0 in this case, income tax revenues
are zero, thus, there are no government grants (i.e., D = 0), and all giving to charity is
private giving. Conversely, if at a social optimum t > 0, then G￿
t > 0 (but G￿
t > 0 does
not necessarily imply that t > 0).
We now show, in Proposition 8, that if subsidies are e⁄ective then no direct government
grant is needed. This is because when private donations replace an identical amount of
public donations, welfare improves on account of the warm glow received by private givers.
Proposition 8 : If at an optimum G￿
s ￿ 0 then s attains its maximum value and the
government makes no direct contributions to charity, i.e., D = 0. Conversely, if a social
optimum involves positive government donations, i.e., D > 0 then, necessarily, G￿
s < 0:
Proposition 9 : If at a social optimum (i) Fs ￿ 0 and FG < 1, or if (ii) Fs ￿ 0 and
FG > 1, then all charitable contributions come from individual private donations and
D = 0.
24The intuition behind Proposition 9 can be seen from the results in Propositions 5, 6.
In Proposition 9(i), for instance, the comparative statics are normal (and not perverse),
hence, private giving can be encouraged through the use of subsidies. Since private giving
leads to warm glow, and an improvement in welfare, it is optimal to generate all charitable
giving through private giving, rather than by direct government grants. A similar intuition
explains Proposition 9(ii).
8. Equilibrium outcomes for the examples in section 4
We now apply the general theory developed so far to the two examples of section 4.
8.1. Example 1: Charitable contributions as public redistribution
Consider the setup of the ￿rst example in subsection 4.1 that we now take as given. Let







i=1 mi = M: (8.1)
And when all consumers who have positive income are caring (i.e., k = p), then








Proposition 10 summarizes the main results.
Proposition 10 : (a) (Multiple equilibria) The only economically interesting cases occur
when [m + t(M ￿ m)]
2 > 4(1 ￿ s)A: In this case, we have two distinct, real, positive,






m + t(M ￿ m) ￿
q
[m + t(M ￿ m)]
2 ￿ 4(1 ￿ s)A
￿
.
(b) (Increasing and concave desire to contribute) The aggregate desire to give, F(:), (i)
responds positively to subsides i.e., Fs > 0 and, (ii) it is increasing and concave i.e., FG > 0;
FGG < 0. So we have the case depicted in Figure 6.1. Furthermore,
G = G
+ ) FG < 1; G = G
￿ ) FG > 1:
(c) (Perverse and normal comparative statics) The comparative statics with respect to
the subsidy are perverse at the low equilibrium and normal at the high equilibrium, i.e.,
G￿
s < 0; G+
s > 0. For m < M (and so k < p) the same holds for the comparative static
result with respect to the tax rate, i.e., G
￿
t < 0; G
+
t > 0. For k = p, G
￿
t = 0.
25The equilibria are as in Figure 6.1. Suppose an economy is at the low equilibrium, G￿,
and also suppose that it is socially desirable to move it to the high equilibrium, G+. How
can this be done? The situation is identical to the one presented in section 6.1, and so we
follow the same solution method.
From Proposition 10(b), due to perverse comparative statics at the low equilibrium,
G
￿
t ￿ 0: Hence, from Proposition 7, it would appear that the best policy is no intervention
i.e., s = t = 0; leaving the economy at the low equilibrium, G￿. However, an alternative
policy is possible, as we shall now describe; see Figures 8.1, 8.2.
Figure 8.1: Multiple equilibria when Ft > 0; FG > 0; FGG < 0.
Set the tax rate t as t = G￿(0;0)=M. Since G￿(0;0) is an equilibrium, hence, 0 <
G￿(0;0) < M. It follows that 0 < t < 1 and, hence, it is feasible. Set s;D as follows:
s = 0 and D = tM = G￿(0;0).
Thus, the government gives a direct grant equal to G￿ (0;0) ￿nanced with an income
tax (any grant D > G￿(0;0) will also work). Since gi > 0 for some i (i = 1;2;:::;k) it
follows, from (3.9), that G > D = G￿(0;0). Hence, because we are now on the F(0;t;G)
locus (see Figure 8.1) and the equilibrium aggregate donation G > G￿(0;0) > G￿(0;t),
the only possible candidate for equilibrium is
G = G
+(0;t). (8.4)
Once the economy is at the high equilibrium, G+(0;t), the ￿scal parameters, s,t can be
adjusted to their socially optimum values. We now address this issue.
8.1.1. Socially optimal public policy at the new equilibrium
At the low equilibrium, G￿(0;0), private individuals cannot be induced to make additional
contributions because of the perverse comparative statics, G￿
s (0;0) < 0, G
￿
t (0;0) < 0: In
26contrast, the comparative statics at the high equilibrium, G+(s;t), for any values of s;t are
normal. We now illustrate the insights of subsection 6.1 for the concrete case of Example
4.1. Consider two cases.
1. If k < p, so that not all consumers with positive income are caring and so do not
contribute to charity, then, m < M. Hence, from Proposition 10(c), G+
s > 0, G
+
t > 0,
i.e., the comparative static e⁄ects are reversed at the high equilibrium; see Figure 8.2.
Depending on the parameter values, the optimal tax rate may be positive, in which
case it can be found by setting Vt = 0 in (7.6). From Proposition 10(b), at the high
equilibrium G+, Fs > 0, and FG < 1, so, Proposition 9 implies that D = 0. Thus,
once the economy has moved from G￿ to G+; the direct grant from the government to
the charity is phased out. In the new, socially optimal, equilibrium, all contributions
to charity are exclusively private (because only private contributions are associated
with warm glow) and all income tax revenue is used to subsidize private donations
to charity.
Figure 8.2: The response of equilibrium G to the tax rate.
2. If k = p; so that all consumers with positive income contribute to charity, then, from
(8.2), m = M. Hence, from Proposition 10(c), G
+
t = 0. It follows, from Proposition
7, that s = t = 0. Thus, once the (one-o⁄) direct government grant to charity
(￿nanced by an income tax) has shifted the economy from the bad equilibrium, G￿,
to the good equilibrium, G+, no further government intervention is needed and the
entire charitable contributions come from voluntary private contributions. So at the
new optimum, equilibrium is described by G+(0;0) =
Xn
i=1 gi(0;0;G+(0;0)).
278.1.2. A numerical illustration
We now illustrate the insights of the previous subsection by a numerical example. Consider
an economy with n = 1900 consumers. Of these, 1000 do not have an income of their own
and they are supported by charity. The other p = 900 consumers each has a positive
income mi = 1; i = 1;2;:::;900. Of these, k = 450 get a warm glow from giving to charity.
Speci￿cally, ai = 0:01 (see the utility function in (4.1)) for i = 1;2;:::;450. The others do
not derive warm glow from giving to charity, i.e., ai = 0 for i = 451;452;:::;1900. Thus,
m =
X450










Initially, assume that s = t = 0. Then G￿(0;0) = 150, G+(0;0) = 300. Suppose that the
locus passing through G￿ is considered to be socially inferior to that passing through G+.
How can government policy shift the economy onto the better locus?




t < 0, the best policy would appear to be no intervention: s = t = 0. However, there
is an alternative. The government sets s = 0; t = 1=6. This raises a total tax revenue
equal to tM = 900=6 = 150: Since G
￿
t < 0, it follows that G￿(0;1=6) < 150 at t = 1=6.
The government makes a direct grant D = G￿(0;0) = 150 to the charity. Since gi > 0;
i = 1;2;:::;450, we must have G(0;1=6) = D+
X450
i=1 gi(0;1=6;G) > D = 150 = G￿(0;0) >
G￿(0;1=6). Hence, the only possible equilibrium is G = G+(0;1=6). Once the economy is
on the G+ locus, s;t can be given their optimal values as shown in the previous subsection.
8.2. Example 2: Charitable contributions as voluntary contributions to a public
good
We now consider the second example outlined in section 4.2, above, which the reader may
consult before reading on. De￿ne the constants B;C as:
B =
Xn
i=1 aimi + t
Xn
i=1 (1 ￿ ai)mi;C =
Xn
i=1 aibi (8.5)
The main results for this example are listed in Proposition 11, below.
Proposition 11 : (a) (Multiple equilibria) The only economically interesting cases occur
when B2 > 4C. In this case, we have two distinct real positive equilibria 0 < G￿ < G+.











(b) (Increasing and concave desire to contribute) The aggregate desire to give, F(:) (i)
responds positively to taxes, i.e., Ft > 0; (ii) is unresponsive to subsidies, i.e., Fs = 0, and,
(ii) it is increasing and concave, i.e., FG > 0; FGG < 0 (as in Figure 6.1). Furthermore,
G = G
+ ) FG < 1; G = G
￿ ) FG > 1:
28(c) (Perverse and normal comparative statics) The comparative statics with respect to the
income tax are perverse at the low equilibrium and normal at the high equilibrium, i.e.,
G
￿
t < 0; G
+
t > 0. Subsidies are ine⁄ective in in￿ uencing aggregate giving, i.e., Gs = 0.
From Proposition 11, we know that the economy has two equilibria as in Figure 6.1.
1. The low equilibrium is characterized by low voluntary contributions to the public
good, causing low aggregate spending on the public good infrastructure, G￿. From
(4.4), to achieve any speci￿c utility level, high private consumption expenditure is
needed. From the budget constraint, (3.6), we see that less income can be contributed
to the public good, perpetuating the low expenditure on infrastructure.
2. The high equilibrium is characterized by high contributions to the public good, caus-
ing high aggregate expenditure on infrastructure, G+. In turn, this implies that rel-
atively less private consumption expenditure is needed to reach any speci￿c utility
level. Hence, relatively more income is left over to donate to charity, perpetuating
high expenditure on infrastructure.
Suppose that the economy is at the low equilibrium, G￿, and that it is socially desirable
to move the economy to the high equilibrium, G+. How can this transition be achieved?
From Proposition 11(c), we know that incentives in the form of a subsidy will not work
because Gs = 0. From Proposition 11(c), G
￿
t < 0, so, from Proposition 7, it would appear
that, at the low equilibrium G￿, the best feasible policy is no intervention: s = t = 0,
leaving the economy at the low equilibrium G￿. However, an alternative policy is possible,





Since G￿ (0;0) is an equilibrium, 0 < G￿ (0;0) < M. Hence, it follows, from Proposi-
tion 3(a), that 0 < t < 1, which is a feasible tax rate. Set s = 0 and D = tM = G￿ (0;0),
i.e., the government gives a direct grant to public good provision equal to G￿ (0;0), and
￿nanced from an income tax. Since gi > 0 it follows, from (3.9), that G > D = G￿ (0;0).
Since we are now on the F(0;t;G) locus (see Figure 8.1) and the equilibrium aggregate
donation G > G￿ (0;0) > G￿ (0;t), the only possible equilibrium is G = G+ (0;t). Once
the economy is on the high equilibrium, s, t can be adjusted to their socially optimal
values, an issue that we now turn to.
8.2.1. Socially optimal public policy at the new equilibrium
From Proposition 11(b) the relevant graphs are as in Figures 6.1, 8.2 and 8.1. Once the
economy has moved to the new equilibrium, G+, the direct grant from the government
29towards the public good can be phased out. It is welfare improving to do so because of
the normal comparative statics at the high equilibrium, and the fact that private giving
confers warm glow, while an equivalent amount of direct grants does not.
In the low equilibrium, G￿, we have seen above that the optimal policy solution is
s = t = 0. However, from Proposition 11(c), we know that at the high equilibrium,
G
+
t > 0, and so, the comparative static results are reversed from the low equilibrium. The
optimal tax rate, which can be found from (7.6), balances the loss in private consumption
against the gain arising from the additional amount of the public good. Also, from (7.5),
Vs > 0, hence, it is welfare improving to provide additional subsidies. Thus, all tax
revenues are used to ￿nance subsidies on charitable donations. In the socially optimal
solution at the high equilibrium, G+, therefore, s > 0; t > 0 while D = 0 (see Proposition
8).
8.2.2. Numerical illustration
As a numerical illustration, consider an economy of n = 50 identical consumers, each with
income mi = 1. Choose ai = 0:1 and bi = 0:8 (the relevant utility function in given
in (4.4)). Suppose that initially, s = t = 0. Then (8.5), (8.6) give G￿(0;0) = 1 and
G+(0;0) = 4, and the feasibility condition (4.5) is satis￿ed (see Figure 8.1).
Suppose that the economy is, initially, at the low equilibrium G￿(0;0) = 1. If the move









and the feasibility condition (4.5) still holds at this tax rate. The government uses its
entire tax revenue tM = 1 = G￿(0;0) to make a contribution D = G￿(0;0) = 1 to the
public good. Since g￿
i > 0; G￿(0;0:02) = D +
Xn
i=1 g￿
i > 1 = G￿(0;0). In terms of Figure
8.1, the economy is on the F(0;0:02;G) locus. Hence, the only candidate for equilibrium
is G = G+(0;0:02). Once the economy is on the high equilibrium, G+(0;0:02), the policy
parameters s;t can be adjusted to their socially optimal values. This will involve the
phasing out of the direct grant. Once the ￿nal position of the, new, socially optimal,
equilibrium is established, the government uses all tax revenues to subsidize voluntary
contributions to the public good. The direct grant, here, is only a temporary measure to
shift the economy from the low equilibrium to the high equilibrium.
9. Strategic giving
Under strategic giving, each giver, i, takes as given G￿i = G ￿ gi, the contributions of
all others, and behaves strategically with respect to all others. One would expect that, as
30the number of individuals increases, the outcomes under the competitive and the strategic
approaches should converge. Here, for our two examples in Section 8, we show that this is
the case for even reasonably small number of givers.
9.1. Nash equilibria for Example 1 (public redistribution)
We ￿rst derive the symmetric Nash equilibria (SNE) for Example 1 in Section 8 (see also
Figure 4.1). Suppose that all caring individuals with positive income are identical. Recall
that there was no such symmetry restriction in the case of a competitive equilibrium;
in this sense competitive equilibria are less restricted. Using the same parameter values
as in the numerical example in subsection 8.1.2, we have ai = a = 0:01, mi = m = 1,
i = 1;2;:::;450. For simplicity, we report the case s = t = D = 0. Other cases are similar.




i = lnci + 0:01gi (gi + G￿i); (9.1)
subject to the individual budget constraint (3.6). We have replaced total aggregate giving,
G, by gi+G￿i. The consumer now takes as given, the contribution of all others, G￿i. The
￿rst order condition to the maximization problem in (9.1) is
(1 ￿ gi)
￿1 = 0:01(G + gi): (9.2)
In a SNE, gi = kG where k = 450. Substituting gi = 450G in (9.2) we get the following
quadratic equation in G : 4:51G2 ￿ 2029:5G + 202500 = 0. Solving for the two Nash
equilibria GN￿, GN+ we get
G
N￿ = 149:33, G
N+ = 300:66: (9.3)
For non-strategic giving, the two equilibria, given in subsection 8.1.2, were G￿ = 150,
G+ = 300. Comparing to (9.3), we ￿nd that the equilibria are virtually identical, as
claimed earlier, although the number of givers, 450, is relatively small.
9.2. Nash equilibria for Example 2 (public goods)
We show here, analytically, the e⁄ect on the equilibrium magnitudes as n ! 1 and also
report simulation exercises for smaller values of n. Rewrite (4.4) as
u






+ ai lngi: (9.4)
31De￿ne the constant di = bi=n and rewrite (9.4) as33
u






















= (1 ￿ ai)ln
￿







Under non-strategic (competitive) giving, each consumer chooses her contribution, given
the per capita aggregate contribution, G=n. Therefore, in a competitive market equilib-






2 = 0: (9.7)
Under strategic giving, on the other hand, each consumer chooses her contribution, given
the contribution of all others, G￿i. Therefore, the problem of the consumer is to maximize










3 = 0: (9.8)
Comparing (9.7), (9.8) we see that, because wi
3 is bounded, as n ! 1, the ￿rst order
conditions for strategic and non-strategic giving coincide. Note that this result does not
depend on any particular function form, hence, it is completely general.
It remains to show, as we did in subsection 9.1, that even for smaller n, the equilibria
of the two models are reasonably close. To keep the exposition simple, and to ensure
comparability with the literature, we focus on symmetric equilibria below. Set di = d;
ai = a and mi = m for all i. Furthermore, to simplify the exposition we report the case
s = t = D = 0:
9.2.2. Symmetric Nash equilibria (SNE)
Using (9.5), (9.8), the ￿rst order condition in the case of a SNE is
1 ￿ a










33Note that di is now a parameter of the model. This reformulation is necessary because as n increases,
G increases and so e⁄ectively the parameter bi in the original formulation falls relative to G. In other
words, such a replication of the economy alters the underlying model, which is not admissible. The
reformulation in terms of the parameter di, however, is not subject to this problem.
32In a SNE, g = G
n. Substituting G = ng in (9.9) we get the following quadratic equation
for individual donation in g : g2 ￿ amg + d(a ￿ n￿1(1 ￿ a)) = 0. Solving this equation,









m2a2 ￿ 4d(a ￿ n￿1(1 ￿ a))
i
: (9.10)
9.2.3. Symmetric non-strategic (competitive) equilibria
In order to compare with a symmetric Nash equilibrium, we now compute the symmetric
competitive equilibrium. In this case, the consumer takes as given the aggregate contribu-
tions, G. Using (9.5), (9.7), the ￿rst order condition is
(1 ￿ a)






In a symmetric equilibrium, g = G=n. Substituting G = ng in (9.11) we get a quadratic
equation in g : g2 ￿ amg + ad = 0, from which we get the two solutions in a competitive











Clearly, from (9.10), (9.12), gN+ ! g+ and gN￿ ! g￿; as n ! 1.
9.2.4. Simulations
In this subsection we address, numerically, the question of whether the results under
strategic and non-strategic giving are similar for reasonably small number of givers? From
(9.12), the equilibrium level of individual giving in the symmetric non-strategic equilibrium
is independent of the number of givers, n. Substituting m = 1; a = 0:1, b = 0:8, d = b
50 =
0:016 in (9.12), it can be checked that for any n
g
￿ = 0:2, g
+ = 0:8: (9.13)
Using (9.10), in Table-I, below, we report the simulation results for optimal individual
giving in the symmetric strategic case, gN￿, as n increases, using m = 1; a = 0:1, d = 0:016.
TABLE-I : Multiple Nash Equilibria as the Number of Givers Varies
n 100 500 1000 10;000
gN￿ 0:0177 0:0195 0:0198 0:02
gN+ 0:0823 0:0805 0:0802 0:08
It is evident that even for relatively small values of n, the SNE, gN￿ and gN+, converge
rapidly to the competitive equilibria, g￿ and g+, given in (9.13). These numbers seem
to accord with the actual size of a typical individual donation relative to the budget of a
33charity. Furthermore, it allows one to conduct comparative static results that would be
di¢ cult in the case of strategic giving, even if restricted to the case of a symmetric Nash
equilibrium.
10. Conclusions
Private philanthropic activity is much studied in economics and is of immense economic
importance. The empirical evidence suggests that the vast bulk of giving activity is un-
dertaken by very large numbers of diverse, dispersed and small givers. For givers of such
nature, the competitive equilibrium model in economics would seem to be a natural ￿t.
However, the existing literature has typically described giving activity within the ambit of
a symmetric Nash equilibrium in strategic giving. Furthermore, the literature has, by and
large, restricted itself to a unique equilibrium in giving. We relax both these features of
the existing literature.
Coordination problems and multiple equilibria are the norm in situations of economic
interest, but they are often ruled out by assumption. It is not surprising that uncoor-
dinated individual giving might lead to the possibility of multiple equilibria in private
giving. We show that a necessary condition for multiple equilibria is aggregate strategic
complementarity between own-giving and aggregate-giving to a charity. Strategic comple-
mentarity at the level of each giver is su¢ cient but not necessary for aggregate strategic
complementarity.
Once one allows for multiple equilibria that can potentially be ranked according to
some social criteria, the following question arises naturally. If society is stuck at a low
equilibrium, characterized by low levels of giving, can public policy help it to attain a
high equilibrium? This is not a trivial question because our understanding of engineering
moves between alternative equilibria is not very well developed. In the context of private
philanthropic activity, we show that temporary direct government grants to charities allow
for such engineering of moves between equilibria.34 The signi￿cance of this result, to our
mind, goes beyond the philanthropic context that we are interested in.
We also perform a welfare analysis and examine the optimality of alternative mixes
of private and public contributions to charity. We show, for some parameter values, that
additional incentives to giving, can reduce the aggregate of private contributions in equi-
librium (perverse comparative statics). In such cases, it might be best to ￿nance charitable
giving, if required, by direct government grants ￿nanced through taxation. For other pa-
rameter values, however, giving to charity responds well to incentives (normal comparative
statics). In this case, charitable giving should be entirely funded by private individual
34This result, in our model, also has the potential to explain the e¢ cacy of seed money, leadership
contributions, and direct grants by large donors, e.g., the National Lottery (as in the UK).
34contributions, possibly subsidized through taxation. This is welfare improving in this case
because private giving leads to warm glow, while direct government grants do not.
Throughout we focus on equilibrium analysis. The dynamics of time paths from one
equilibrium to another involve fundamental questions about the precise learning mecha-
nisms to be used. Although progress on learning mechanisms is being made and in due
course such mechanisms may enrich our model, currently such issues lie beyond the scope
of this paper.
11. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose
ci < (1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i. (11.1)
Let
ci (gi) = (1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i ￿ (1 ￿ s)gi, (11.2)
then, from (3.10), we get
U
i (gi;G;s;t) = u
i (ci (gi);gi;G)ci (gi), (11.3)
U
i
1 (gi;G;s;t) = u
i
2 (ci (gi);gi;G) ￿ (1 ￿ s)u
i
1 (ci (gi);gi;G), (11.4)
From (11.2), note that, as gi " 1
1￿s [(1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i ￿ ci], ci (gi) # ci and, hence, ui
1 (ci (gi);gi;G) "
1 (recall, (3.4)). On the other hand, since, by assumption, ui
22 ￿ 0, ui
2 remains bounded
above as gi " 1
1￿s [(1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i ￿ ci]. Hence, from (11.4), it follows that Ui
1 # ￿1 as
gi " 1
1￿s [(1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i ￿ ci]. Therefore, there must be a gi < 1
1￿s [(1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i ￿ ci]
such that Ui
1 < 0 at gi = gi. From (3.11) it then follows that Ui
1 < 0 for all gi ￿ gi. Thus,
if there is a g￿
i that solves the consumers maximization problem (3.12), then, necessarily,
g￿
i ￿ gi. If ui can be extended as a continuous function to the boundary, gi = 0, then take
g
i = 0. Otherwise, using the assumptions that ui
11 ￿ 0 and ui
2 " 1 as gi # 0, we can show
that there is a g
i > 0 such that g￿
i (if it exists) must satisfy g￿
i ￿ g














i must be a global maximum. Furthermore, 0 ￿ g￿
i < 1
1￿s [(1 ￿ t)mi + ￿i ￿ ci] and,
from (3.11), g￿
i is unique. This establishes parts (a) and (b). If, in addition, (3.5) holds,
then a similar argument shows that g￿
i > 0. This establishes part (c). ￿
Proof of Proposition 2: If g￿
i > 0, then, in the light of part (b) of Proposition 1, g￿
i is an
interior maximum and part (a) follows. Part (b) follow as a simple consequence of (3.10).
Appealing to the implicit function theorem, or di⁄erentiating the identity, (1 ￿ s)ui
1 = ui
2,
establishes parts (c), (d) and (e). ￿
35Proof of Lemma 1: Follows from (3.10) and De￿nition 1. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2: (a) First, suppose that g￿
i > 0. The result then follows from Lemma




@G ￿ 0 (￿ 0) holds for all g￿
i ￿ 0. Then, a fortiori, it holds for all
g￿
i > 0. Hence, by (a), gi and G are strategic complements (substitutes). (bii) Since ui is
C2, g￿
i is C1, i.e.,
@g￿
i
@G is continuous. Now, suppose that gi and G are strategic complements
(substitutes). Then, by (a),
@g￿
i
@G ￿ 0 (￿ 0) holds for all g￿







@G ￿ 0 (￿ 0) holds for g￿
i ￿ 0. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3: Follows from (5.6) and Lemma 2. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4: Let G￿ be an equilibrium at which FG 6= 1. Then, from
Proposition 3c, G￿ is isolated. By De￿nition 4, G￿ = F (s;t;G￿). Di⁄erentiating this
implicitly, and rearranging, gives the required results. ￿
Proof of Propositions 5 and 6: Obvious from Proposition 4(a),(b), respectively, and
Lemma 3. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7: Let (s;t) maximize social welfare (7.4). We have assumed that
mi ￿ 0; with some mi > 0; ui
1 > 0; ui
3 ￿ 0 and Ui > 0. If Gt ￿ 0 then, from (7.6), Vt < 0
and it follows that necessarily, s = t = 0. The last statement in the proposition is simply
the contrapositive of the ￿rst. ￿
Proof of Proposition 8: Let (s;t) maximize social welfare (7.4). We have assumed that
gi ￿ 0; with some gi > 0, ui
1 > 0; ui
3 ￿ 0 and Ui > 0. If Gs ￿ 0 then the ￿rst order
condition (7.5) implies that Vs > 0 and so, the subsidy s attains its maximum possible
value. Recall from subsection 3.1 that, by assumption, the maximum value of s is bounded
away from unity. The consequence of s = 1 is that, from (3.6), the price of giving is zero
and so any individual with ui
2 > 0 would like to give an in￿nite amount to charity. Since
individual private giving can be increased substantially by decreasing its price, it is best
to channel all giving privately because of the additional bene￿t arising to each individual
from warm glow and, therefore, D = 0. The last statement in the proposition is simply
the contrapositive of the ￿rst. ￿
Proof of Proposition 9: From Proposition 4(a), G￿
s (s;t) = Fs
1￿FG. So when Fs ￿ 0 and
FG < 1, or if Fs ￿ 0 and FG > 1, we get G￿
s (s;t) > 0. Proposition 8 then implies that s
attains its maximum value and direct government grants are zero. ￿















; i = 1;:::;k. (11.6)
From (4.2) and (11.5) we see that g￿
i (s;t;G) > 0 and from (11.6) c￿
i (s;t;G) > 0. On the
36other hand, from (4.3) we get that
g
￿
i ￿ 0; i = k + 1;k + 2;:::;n. (11.7)
From (5.2), (8.1) - (8.3), (11.5), the aggregate desire to give to charity is




) Ft = M ￿ m ￿ 0. (11.9)
The inequality in (11.9) is strict for m < M, i.e., k < p. Direct di⁄erentiation of (11.8)




> 0, FG = (1 ￿ s)
A
G2 > 0, FGG = ￿2(1 ￿ s)
A
G3 < 0: (11.10)
From De￿nition 4 and (11.8), an equilibrium G, must satisfy the quadratic equation
G
2 ￿ [m + t(M ￿ m)]G + (1 ￿ s)A = 0. (11.11)






m + t(M ￿ m) ￿
q
[m + t(M ￿ m)]
2 ￿ 4(1 ￿ s)A
￿
. (11.12)
For real roots we need [m + t(M ￿ m)]
2 ￿ 4(1 ￿ s)A. If [m + t(M ￿ m)]
2 = 4(1 ￿ s)A
then, from (11.10), FG = 1. From Proposition 4(a),(b) it would follow that G￿
s, G￿
t are
unde￿ned. Hence, the only economically interesting cases occur when,
[m + t(M ￿ m)]
2 > 4(1 ￿ s)A, (11.13)




Using the fact that for real numbers a;b, a > b:
p




b, as well as (11.10) and
(11.12) - (11.14), we get
G = G
+ ) FG < 1, G = G
￿ ) FG > 1. (11.15)
From Proposition 4(a),(b), (11.9), (11.10), (11.15) we get
G
+
s > 0; G
￿
s < 0, (11.16)
G
+
t > 0; G
￿
t < 0 (for m < M, i.e., k < p), (11.17)
37G
￿
t = 0 (for m = M, i.e., k = p). (11.18)
Proof of Proposition 11: Applying Proposition 2(b) to the utility function (4.4), and














i(s;t;G) = (1 ￿ ai)
￿








From (4.5) and (11.19), (11.20), we see that g￿




thermore, it is straightforward to verify that the second order conditions also hold. Hence,
given s;t;G; g￿
i(s;t;G), c￿
i(s;t;G) maximize utility (4.4) subject to the budget constraint
(3.6), and are unique.
Substituting from (11.19) into (5.2) the aggregate desire to give, F(s;t;G) is:
F(s;t;G) =
Xn
i=1 aimi + t
Xn





From (11.21) we get:
Fs = 0;Ft =
Xn








i=1 aibi < 0.
(11.22)







From (11.22) and Proposition 9, it follows that, at a social optimum, D = 0, i.e., no direct
grant from the government to the charity is involved. Giving to charity is entirely funded
by private donations, which are subsidized from taxation if s > 0, t > 0.
To make further progress, we need to determine the equilibrium values of G. From (5.2),
(11.21) and De￿nition 4, the equilibrium values of G are the solutions to the equation
G =
Xn
i=1 aimi + t
Xn





Substituting (8.5) in (11.24) we get
G












38If B2 < 4C; then no equilibrium exists. If B2 = 4C then a unique equilibrium exists, and
is G = B
2 =
p
C: But then, from (11.22), (8.5), FG = 1. In this case, neither Gs nor Gt
are de￿ned, see Proposition 4(a),(b). Hence, the only interesting case is when B2 > 4C.




Using the fact that for real numbers a > b > 0:
p




b, as well as (11.22),
(8.5) and (11.26) - (11.27), we get
G = G
+ ) FG < 1, G = G
￿ ) FG > 1. (11.28)
From (11.22), (11.28) and Proposition 4(b), we get G
+
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